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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the solution revealed by the decisions in the Prison Goods cases, 151 it would
seem politically unwise at this time to so amend our Constitution. This remedy
of national and state cooperation has the virtue of preserving state control.
Because of the alarming increase in national bureaucracy, this advantage alone
merits that solution a trial. This compromise seems capable of removing the
last stages of child labor from the American scene.
PIAROL EVIDENCE RULE IN WARRANTIES OF SALE OF GOODS-CONTRACTUAL
DISCLAIMRS.-A cursory examination of bargains for the sale of personalty
will indicate that warranty representations are matters of recurring dispute,
and that in such transactions the time-honored and precautionary formalities
impressed upon realty transfers are usually lacking. In the feudal system the
transfer of personalty did not attain the dignity and solemnity of a sale of
realty. The transfer of a chattel was, and was treated as, relatively unim-
portant; it was carried through with informality. Litigation over the terms
of the transfer resulted. These personal dealings, and over the counter sales
of chattels, not unsuited to an age of informal barter, are rapidly being over-
shadowed by modem business practice. In the course of a century the eco-
nomic world has seen the transition of sales agreements from the setting and
practices of the small town or sea port to the intricate commercial processes
of the present day,1 but the litigation over the terms of the sales contract
continues. The outcome of such litigation often depends upon the effective
proving of warranties alleged to have been made by the seller. If the contract
had consisted of written or printed matter, the proof of the warranty is de-
pendent upon the exclusionary effect of the parol evidence doctrine. It is this
relationship of the parol evidence rule and the warranty obligation which will
be treated here.
Clarity requires that the commentary be divided into the following topics:
I. The History and Nature of the Parol Evidence Rule; II. The Completeness
of the Written Contract; III. Warranties as Collateral Agreements; IV. The
Express Warranty; V. The Restatement on Express Warranties; VI. The Im-
plied Warranties; VII. The Express Warranty Excluding the Implied War-
ranty; VIII. Written Disclaimers of Warranties.
I. THE HISTORY AND NATURE OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
The doctrine of parol evidence, that oral testimony is inadmissible to con-
tradict, vary, add to, or subtract from the terms of a valid written contract,
has found general acceptance in the common law; despite this general ac-
ceptance, however, few principles in the realm of jurisprudence have been so
subject to diversified opinion and contradictory application. The testing
ground for the doctrine is the heavily litigated field of warranties of personal
property.
Originally, no unique validity attached per se to written forms.2 The truth
157. Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431 (1936); Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois
Central Ry., 299 U. S. 334 (1936).
1. LTZWLLYNr, CASES AND MATMIALS ON ma LAw OF SALES (1930) 204.
2. The fact was that the writing did not legally establish anything. 5 WomoR, Evi-
DENcE (2d ed. 1923) § 2426.
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or falsity of alleged happenings was determined generally at early common
law by "transaction witnesses" 3 introduced by the parties. Indeed, it is under-
standable that in an age of pandemic illiteracy very few had recourse to
writing as a memorial of their dealings. So unique was the ability to write
that the possessor was a child of special legal privilege, and so mystifying was
his accomplishment that it was met only with the suspicion of the ignorant. It
required the introduction and popular acquisition of the seal; with its accom-
panying doctrine of incontrovertibility, to create incipient respect for the trust-
worthiness of instruments. The seal which men imposed on their written
declarations was of sufficient weight to stifle denial in court.0 A man's word
was as good as his bond. With the decay of the cumbersome method of proof
by transaction witnesses and the widespread knowledge of reading and writing
further impetus was given to the doctrinal regard for writing. The mercantile
theory of the indisputability of credit instruments had made its impreasion on
the common law.7 Not to be minimized was the favor with which the common
law judges had looked on the parol evidence rule because they recognized in it
an excellent weapon for the control of the jury.8 With the enactment of the
Statute of Frauds9 the parol evidence rule assumed its modem proportions.
The Statute, although restricted in its application, gave a validity to unsealed
writings which they did not before possess.' 0 The writing, thereafter, was
no longer mere evidence of an agreement, but had a constitutive force of its
own?- It no longer "witnesseth"; it is the fact itself. It is the "shibboleth
repeated in 10,000 cases." 12
3. Ibid. The cases in which this mode of trial was used appear to have bccn confined
to claims arising out of sales or loans. Ho- , THE Cos rso. LW (I$51) 255.
4. At first the seal belonged properly only to the kings and nobles. HoLMEs, TAU
Co=ozr LAw (1881) 272. By the end of the thirteenth century freemen had their szals.
2 PoLocx AND MAruLAND, Hxsrory or EN-GLisH LAw (2d ed. 1923) 221.
5. Backus, The Origin and Use of Private Seals Under Common Law (1917) 51 Air.
L. SCHooL REv. 369.
6. In such high repute was the seal held that the owner was bound by it even thou~h
affixed without his consent. 9 HoLDsworrH, HzTORy or Eria'ISn L~w (1926) 157; Hozs,
THE CoarroTor LAw (1881) 272.
7. The common law courts were undoubtedly influenced by the law merchant (S Yfi,-
mioaz, Evm D mc (2d ed. 1923) § 2426), but it was not until the year 1666, however,
that the courts declared the mercantile law to be "the law of the realm". Woodward
v. Rowe, 2 Keb. 105, 84 Eng. Reprints 67 (1656).
8. The common law judges frequently expressed distrust of the jury. Lav'rence v. Dod-
well, 1 Lut. 734, 125 Eng. Reprints 384 (1689); Strode v. Russel, 2 Vern. 621, 23 Ens.
Reprints 1003 (1708). This distrust, it is said, has been somewhat confirmed by the
comparative freedom exercised in the reformation of writings by courts of equity where
no jury sits. McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Devicc for Control of
the Jury (1932) 41 YAr L. J. 365, 368.
9. 29 Car. 11, c. 3 (1676).
10. The first and third sections of the Statute required "writings" or a "deed or note in
writing." The seal was not necessary.
11. Section 7 of the Statute read: "... shall be manifested and proved by some writing
signed .. .or else they shall be void and of none effect" The Statute (which appeared
as a mark rather than a cause of the final development), by requiring proof in writing,
emphasized the constitutive force of the document. S WiGmonr, loc. cit. sufra note 2.
12. McCormick, op. cit. supra note 8, at 369.
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The very statement of the parol evidence rule is not without complexity.Ya
Generally the rule declared is that parol testimony cannot be received to con-
tradict, vary, add to, or subtract from the terms of a valid written instru-
ment. 14  The underlying policy is the preservation of the stability of written
contracts; 15 the theory being that the parties to the contract, by their prefer-
ence for the written act over the oral one, have deliberately integrated'0 the
entire terms of their engagement without any uncertainty as to its object and
extent.17  Hence, as often stated, it is conclusively presumed that the whole
engagement of the parties is confined to the four corners of the writing.'8
II. THE COMPLETENESS OF THE WRITTEN CONTRACT
Logically, the application of the parol evidence rule is denied in those in-
stances where it is determined that the parties intended to restrict the writing
to certain specific elements of the contract, and did not intend it as a full
statement of their contractual rights and obligations. 19 Prevalent examples
of written contracts of sale which are incomplete on their face are those that
qualify the writing "as per conversation",2 0 or "as hereafter agreed". 21  Obvi-
ously, casual writings and memoranda of a transaction are not within the pur-
view of the rule and contemporaneous parol agreements may be shown to
13. "Few things are darker than this, or fuller of subtle difficulties." TUrAYER, A PRc-
LnmqARY TREATISE oN EviDENcE AT THE CoanmoN LAw (1898) 390. See West v. Kelly, 19
Ala. 353, 354, 54 Am. Dec. 192, 193 (1851).
14. JoNEs, THE LAw or EvIDENCE IN CVILv CASES (3d ed. 1924) 656; CEAsE's SmPHEN's
DIGEST or THE LAW or EVIDENCE (2d Am. ed. 1912) 219. The rule as set forth is subjected
to the criticism that if the parties intended to integrate only a part of their agreement,
the remainder of the agreement might be proved, although it added to, or varied the
written portion. 5 WVIGMRE, EvIDENcE (2d ed. 1923) 309.
15. Countess of Rutland's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 256, 77 Eng. Reprints 89 (1604); see In re
Tomarchio, 269 Fed. 400, 497 (E. D. Mo. 1920). "The rule breaths the spirit of the
Statutes of Frauds and Wills." Hale, The Parol Evidence Ride (1925) 4 ORE. L. REV. 91,
92; see Strahorn, The Unity of the Parol Evidence Rule (1929) 14 Mum. L. REV. 20, 24.
16. Integration is the "process of embodying the terms of a jural act in a single
memorial." 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) 289. The terminology has been adopted
by the RESTATE.MENT, CONTRACtS. See footnote 68, infra.
17. Newark v. Mills, 35 F. (2d) 110 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929) see 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDINCE
(16th ed. 1899) 460.
18. Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Machine Co., 141 U. S. 510 (1891) ; Lathrop v. Rice
& Adams Corp., 17 F. Supp. 622 (W. D. N. Y. 1936); Bell v. Flanders, 115 Me. 332, 98
AtI. 825 (1916). Although the courts speak of presumptions the parol evidence rule Is
not a rule of evidence but a rule of substantive law. See Pitcairn v. Philip Hiss Co., 125
Fed. 110, 113 (C. C. A. 3d, 1903); 1 GREENLEAF, EvIDENCE (16th ed. 1899) § 305a. The
parol evidence rule is neither parol nor is it evidence. 5 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed.
1923) 238.
19. Bird & Son, Inc. v. Guarantee Const. Co., 295 Fed. 451 (C. C. A. 1st, 1924);
American Bridge Co. v. Crawford, 31 F. (2d) 708 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929); Blanchard Lumber
Co. v. Maker, 250 Mass. 159, 145 N. E. 62 (1924). See 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTs (Rev. ed.
1936) 1830, and authorities cited therein.
20. Selig v. Rehfuss, 195 Pa. St. 200, 45 AtI. 919 (1900); Klueter v. Joseph Schlitz
Brewing Co., 143 Wis. 347, 128 N. W. 43 (1910).
21. Morrison v. Dickey, 119 Ga. 698, 46 S. E. 863 (1904).
COMMENTS
fill out the vacua in the instrument.2 2 But even here, it should be noted, those
terms which are definitely treated in the incompleted writing cannot be varied
or contradicted,23 in the absence of fraud2 4 or mistake.2 5  An instrument is
not incomplete because it is silent as to all the details which might possibly
have been included in the writing;20 to say that it is, is to beg the whole
question. However, the determination of the writing's completeness may be
ultimately dependent on the amount of detail found in the writing.-7
The difficulty which the courts have encountered in determining whether the
contracting parties intended to reduce their whole agreement to writing is
readily attributable to the necessarily restricted and inadequate legal devices
for guaging contractual intent. Apparently, the accepted determinant of
the completeness of the writing is the face of the writing itself.2-  The
test is subject to the criticism that the courts cannot conclude what
elements the instrument is intended to cover unless evidence of the
subject matter and the circumstances of the execution of the writing be
shown 9 Indeed, an examination of the cases indicates that many courts
adhering to the rule that a writing complete on its face cannot be varied,
actually construe its completeness in the light of the purpose and the circum-
22. Rosenburg v. Capital Cut Stone Co., 28 Ariz. 505, 238 Pac. 330 (1925). Where
the statute requires a written memorandum of a contract, oral evidence cannot be used
to supply proof of the contract terms. Manufacturer's Light Co. v. Lamp, 269 Pa. 517,
112 Atl. 679 (1921).
23. Campbell v. City of Boston, 2S3 Mas. 365, 186 N. E. 577 (1933) (general receipt);
Kay v. Spencer, 29 Wyo. 382, 213 Pac. 571 (1923) (the parol evidence rule has no
application to recitals of fact) ; 5 Wsromc., Ev:mxcn (2d ed. 1923) 306; cf. Davis v. Wells
Fargo & Co., 104 U. S. 159 (1881).
24. Blecher v. Schmidt, 211 Iowa 1063, 235 N. IV. 34 (1931); Bareham & McFarland
Co. v. Kane, 228 App. Div. 396, 240 N. Y. Supp. 123 (4th Dep't 1930); American Pure
Food Co. v. G. W. Elliot & Co., 151 N. C. 393, 66 S. E. 451 (1909). Under the Pennsyl-
vania rulings any oral agreement, prior to, or contemporaneous with the writing could
be proved if it induced the written contract of sale. Juniata Building As:aciation v.
Hetze], 103 Pa. St. 507 (1883). This was upon the theory that the attempt by a party
to take advantage of the omission in the writing is a fraud upon the other party. Coal
Co. v. McShain, 75 Pa. St. 238 (1874). In Michigan, iarranty representations made prior
to a written contract which contains specific warranties cannot be shown to be fraudulent.
Bates Tractor Co. v. Gregory, 199 Mich. 8, 165 N. W. 612 (1917).
25. Andrews v. Andrews, 81 Me. 337, 17 All. 166 (18S9); Goode v. Riley, 153 Mars.
585, 28 N. E. 228 (1891).
26. Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Continental Can Co., 301 Ill. 102, 133 N. E.
711 (1921); Thompson v. Libbey, 34 Mlinn. 374, 26 N. W. 1 (1885); Van Doren v. Guar-
dian Casualty & Guaranty Co., 99 Wash. 68, 168 Pac. 1124 (1917).
27. Wheaton Roller Mill Co. v. John T. Noye Mfg. Co., 66 Mlinn. 156, 68 N. IV.
854 (1896).
28. Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Continental Can Co., 301 Iln. 102, 133 N. E.
711 (1921); Thompson v. Libbey, 34 Mlinn. 374, 26 N. W. 1 (1885); Naumberg v. Young,
44 N. J. L. 331, 43 Am. Rep. 380 (1882); Brantingham v. Huff, 174 N. Y. S3, 66
N. E. 620 (1903).
29. The principle is illustrated by Professor Wigmore: "When two parties are found
playing a game of chess, it cannot be told whether this is the Eole and decisive game,,
or merely one of a series, by watching that particular game." S Vx WGoan, Em=.ca (2d
ed. 1923) § 2431.
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stances of its making.30 This coupling of the tests is not contradictorya1
because "although in form the witnesses may be allowed to recite the facts,
yet in truth the facts will afterwards be treated as immaterial and legally
void if the rule is held applicable. 3 2  The dispute over the proper.guage of
completeness however cannot be regarded as academic. Not only may the
actual intent of the parties be controverted, but the problem also assumes
substantial importance in those jurisdictions where the question of complete-
ness is considered a question of fact within the province of the jury"3 and not
a question of law, as it usually is,3 4 for the court. In such cases findings of
fact may be shaped and controlled by the personal prejudices of the juryman
who tends to favor the party who asserts the warranty, and the jury may read
a warranty into a writing which the litigants at the time of the sale actually
intended to express their whole agreement. 8
III. WARRANTIES AS COLLATERAL AGREEMENTS
Although a written contract of sale may, on its face, give evidence of being
in every way a complete document, it is possible at the same time that the
parties may have made an oral agreement separate and distinct from the
written one.3 6 If such an oral agreement does not contradict the provisions
30. Naumberg v. Young, 44 N. J. L. 331, 43 Am. Rep. 380 (1882); Potter v. Easton,
82 Minn. 247, 84 N. W. 1011 (1901); Wheaton Roller Mill Co. v. John T. Noye Mfg.
Co., 66 Minn. 156, 68 N. W. 854 (1896), complementing Thompson v. Libbey, 34 Minn.
374, 26 N. W. 1 (1885); Sund v. Flagg & S. Co., 86 Ore. 289, 168 Pac. 300 (1917), dis-
tinguishing Looney v. Rankin, 15 Ore. 617, 16 Pac. 660 (1888). North Carolina presents
the extreme of the rule: if oral agreements are made and not included in the writing
then the writing is incomplete and the parol evidence rule does not apply. Exum v. Lynch,
188 N. C. 392, 125 S. E. 15 (1924). It would appear that the liberalized test of "complete-
ness" indicates a trend away from the doctrine of caveat emptor. But see McCormick,
The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of the Jury (1932) 41 YALE
L. J. 365, 366.
31. However, to allow a party to show that a writing is incomplete by oral testimony
and then prove by parol the part omitted would, in effect, dispense with the reason of
the rule. Forsyth Mfg. Co. v. Castlen, 112 Ga. 199, 37 S. E. 485 (1900); Thompson
v. Libbey, 34 Minn. 374, 26 N. W. 1 (1885); see Eighmie v. Taylor, 98 N. Y. 288, 294
(1885).
32. Moran Bros. Co. v. Pacific C. C. Co., 48 Wash. 592, 94 Pac. 106 (1908).
33. Hines v. Wilcox, 96 Tenn. 148, 33 S. W. 914 (1896); Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. v.
Wright, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 234, 70 S. W. 335 (1902) semble.
34. Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Machine Co., 141 U. S. 510, 517 (1891); South
Florida Mills v. Breuchaud, 51 F. (2d) 490 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931); Harrison v. McCormick,
89 Cal. 327, 26 Pac. 830 (1891); Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Continental Can
Co., 301 Ill. 102, 133 N. E. 711 (1921).
35. The jury more often than not upon finding an actual oral agreement dehors the
writing, would determine the contract to be incomplete on grounds of morality rather
than legality. McCoitacix, op. cit. supra note 8, at 366. For the moval necessity of the
seller to recompense the buyer for his loss see AQUINAS, SuaMMA ThIEOLooICA, ETucus, 11, 1I,
question LXXVII, act. 4, (Ricaby translation, 2d ed. 1896) v. 2, 93-94.
36. Pyskoty v. Sobusiak, 109 Conn. 593, 145 Atl. 58 (1929); Mitchell v. Lath, 247
N. Y. 377, 160 N. E. 6416 (1928). Typifying the confusion of the doctrine of incomplete.
ness with the doctrine of collateral contracts is the decision of the court in Forsyth Mfg.
Co. v. Castlen, 112 Ga. 199, 37 S. E. 485 (1900), wherein it is stated that before parol
[Vol. 7
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of the written one, most courts permit it to be proved on the ground that it is
supplementary and collateral to the written document.37 This doctrine that a
collateral contract may be proved is distinct from and should not be confused
with, the rule that an incomplete instrument may be completed by parol.Ps
The tests vary. It is often said that such a collateral contract, to be provable
by parol, must refer to a subject matter separate and distinct from that covered
by the writing. 9 A more ephemeral test of colateralness is the closeness of
the dependency of the oral40 upon the written. The best determinant, and
that generally accepted, 41 is substantially that applied to test the completeness
of the contract, i.e., the intent of the parties. Would the ordinary contract-
ing parties under similar circumstances be expected to embody such oral agree-
ments in the written documents? If not, then the agreement is distinct,
separate and collateral and may be proved.
Historically, warranties were collateral in form. This early form was shaped
by the rigorous enforcement of the doctrine of caveat cmptor, well exemplified
in the oft-cited case of Chandelor v. Lopus. 3 There the mere affirmation that
the vendor's stone was a bezar stone was held insufficient to establish an
action in deceit; "warrantizando vendidit" was a necessary allegation. The
result was that the creation of an effective warranty necessitated the formulaic
use by the seller of the phrase "is warranted" as necessary evidence of an
intent to incur an obligation." The warranty obligation is still commonly
described by cases45 and text4G as a "collateral" contract. In the English
evidence can be admitted to show a collateral agreement, it must appear either from the
contract itself or from attendant circumstances that the contract is incomplete.
37. Buckner v. A. Leon & Co., 204 Cal. 225, 267 Pac. 693 (1928); Johnson v. Burn-
ham, 120 Me. 491, 115 AtI. 261 (1921); Roof v. Jercd, 102 Vt. 129, 146 At. 250 (1929).
See note 36 supra.
3S. Naumberg v. Young, 44 N. J. L. 331, 43 Am. Rep. 380 (1882); Mitchell v.
Lath, 247 N. Y. 377, 160 N. E. 646 (1928).
39. Naumberg v. Young, 44 N. J. L. 331,*43 Am. Rep. 3S0 (18S2); Baca v. Fleming,
25 N. Ml. 643, 187 Pac. 277 (1920).
40. Roof v. Jerd, 102 Vt. 129, 146 Atl. 250 (1929).
41. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Buick Motor Co., 39 F. (2d) 303 (C. C. A.
Sth, 1930); Brosty v. Thompson, 79 Conn. 133, 64 At. 1 (1906); Forsyth Mfg. Co. v.
Castlen, 112 Ga. 199, 37 S. E. 485 (1900).
42. Putnam v. Prouty, 24 N. D. 517, 140 N. W. 93 (1913); North v. Atlas Brick Co.,
281 S. W. 603 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
43. Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Reprints 3 (1625). See McMurtie, Cizandclor v. LoP=s (18S7)
1 HIAxv. L. Rv. 191. "Note that by the civil law every man is bound to warrant the
thing that he selleth or conveyeth although there be no warranty; but the common law
holdeth him not unless there be a warranty either in deed or in law, for Caveat Emrp.or."
Co. L'rr.* 102 a.
44. "This case is a dangerous case and may be the cause of a multitude of actions, if
it be thought that the bare affirmation of the vendor causes the action... ." Popham, J.,
from the manuscript report reprinted in (1894) 8 Hav. L. Ray. 232.
45. Sanderson v. Trump Mfg. Co., 180 Ind. 197, 102 N. E. 2 (1913); Naumberg v.
Young, 44 N. J. L. 331, 43 Am. Rep. 380 (1832); Hurley-Maon Co. v. Stebbins, 104
Wash. 171, 140 Pac. 381 (1914). See 1 Wxwsrox, S.,r.xs (2d ed. 1924) § 182.
46. Vorm, SALEs (1931) 441; B-nI'.A=, S.%r.xs (7th ed. 1931) 686.
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Sale of Goods Act 47 and in many American jurisdictions48 it is described as
such. In form, many warranties are still collateral, such result being achieved
by the express employment of the word "warrant" or "guaranty" outside the
body of the terms of sale.49  In some aspects the warranty is collateral to
the main aspects of the sale. Thus, the passage of title to goods is not con-
ditioned upon the existence of a warranty, 0 and the breach of the obligation
does not ipso facto avoid the transfer. 51  Moreover, the breach of the war-
ranty may be the subject of an independent action for damages. 2 The
American courts, however, in adhering to the doctrine enunciated in Seitz v.
Brewers' Refrigerating Machine Co.53 almost uniformly hold that a warranty
is one of the terms of a sale, and not a separate contract. 4 Thus the assumption
is that the natural acts of the contracting parties would be to incorporate the
warranty in the writing, and consequently a parol warranty cannot be added
to a complete written contract on the .ground that it is collateral to the
writing.55 Of course a warranty supported by separate consideration can
always be proved as an independent contractP06
IV. THE ExPRESS WARRANTY
An express warranty, as generally distinguished from a warranty inde-
pendently imposed by law, 57 is defined under the Uniform Sales Act as, "Any
affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods .. . if
the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer
to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon."58
Originally, the warranty obligation was treated as sounding in tort alone,"9
47. SALE OF GooDs ACT (1893) § 62.
48. See note 45, supra.
49. Holt & Duggan Co. v. Clary, 146 Ga. 46, 90 S. E. 381 (1916) ("guarantee above
property only as to title").
50. Burntisland Shipbuilding Co. v. Barde Steel Products Corp., 278 Fed. 552 (1922)
(express disclaimer of warranty).
51. Shupe v. Collender, 56 Conn. 489, 15 Atl. 405, 1 L. R. A. 339 (1888). UNIFORM SA=S
ACT (1907) § 69 (1) ; SALE OF GooDs ACT (1893) § 62 (1).
52. Berman v. Littauer, 141 Md. 639, 119 Atl. 565 (1922); UNIFORM SALES Acr (1907)
§ 69 (1) (b).
53. 141 U. S. 510 (1891).
54. The three leading cases on the subject are Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Machine
Co., 141 U. S. 510 (1891); Naumberg v. Young, 44 N. J. L. 331, 43 Am. Rep. 380 (1882),
and Thompson v. Libbey, 34 Minn. 374, 26 N. W. 1 (1885).
55. Century Electric Co. v. Detroit Copper & Brass Rolling Mills, 264 Fed. 49 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1920) (oral warranty of brass rods); Naumberg v. Young, 44 N. J..L. 331, 43
Am. Rep. 380 (1882) (oral warranty that a boiler would furnish sufficient steam for
the business). "The rule forbids to add by parol where the writing is silent, as well as
to vary where it speaks." Thompson v. Libbey, 34 Minn. 374, 377, 26 N. W. 1, 2 (1885).
56. Offenburg v. Arrow Distilleries Co., 222 Ill. App. 512 (1921); Lewis v. Seabury,
74 N. Y. 409, 30 Am. Rep. 311 (1878).
57. An express warranty "is derived from express language no matter whether in
form a promise or representation." WILaSToN, SALES (2d. ed. 1924) § 194.
58. UNIFoRM SALES ACT (1907) § 12.
59. Chandelor v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Reprints 3 (1625). See 1 STREr, FouNDA-
TiONS OF LEGAL LIABITy (1906) 389. The action on the breach of warranty may still
CO1IMMENTS
and the courts, fearing increased litigation by disappointed purchasers,c2
strictly enforced the doctrine of caveat emptor. This rigid policy deprived the
courts of an adequate means of repressing fraud. "Between the two propo.i-
tions that there can be no warranty without an express agreement and no
fraud without actual knowledge of the falsity of the representation, the in-
genious rascal went free."' 1 The decision of Stuart v. Wilkins0 2 introduced the
curative and modern theory that the warranty obligation is contractual as well
as delictual in nature. So tenacious has been the doctrine laid down in that
case that for a long time some courts required that an express warranty be
promissory in form.6 3  Mlost courts, however, treat express warranties as
purely contractual 4 and hence do not permit the oral express warranties
to be shown by parol where the complete contract of sale has been reduced
to writing.6 5 The oral affirmation or promise is excluded on the ground that
it adds to and varies the written contract." If, however, the contract is in-
complete an oral warranty may always be proved by parol.P7
V. THE RESTATEMENT ON ExTR ss WVARANTiES
The rule laid down by the Restatement of the Law of Contracts-3 is upon
casual reading in accord with the preponaerant holdings of the courts concerning
the exclusion of express warranties. However, the presentation of an example'1 3
illustrating the Restatement rule indicates that a distinction long favored by
textbook writers7" is followed. Thus, where A, the vendor, and B, the vendee,
be brought in tort: scienter need not be alleged or proven. Shippen v. Bowen, 122 U. S.
575 (1S86).
60. See note 44, supra.
61. 1 STRmxr, Fou'rmArioxs OF LEGAL LUaBIEr (1906) 380.
62. 1 Doug. 18, 99 Eng. Reprints 15 (1778).
63. McFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts 55, 34 Am. Dec. 497 (Pa. 1839).
64. See cases cited in notes 41, 54, 55, supra. See 1 Srnarr, Fox.Txo:; or Lror,
L.B]n.= (1906) 390.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. See notes 19, 20, 21, 22, supra.
68. "In What Cases Integration Does Not Affect Prior or Contemporaneous Agree-
ments, (1) an oral agreement is not superseded or invalidated by a subsequent or con-
temporaneous integration, nor a written agreement by a subsequent integration, relating
to the same subject matter, if the agreement is not inconsistent with the integrated con-
tract, and (a) is made for a separate consideration, or (b) is such an agreement as might
naturally be made as a separate agreement by parties situated as were the parties to the
written contract." Ras;.rTEw_, Co:;-acrs § 240.
69. "A and B in an integrated contract respecti.'ely promise to sel and to buy a
specific automobile. A contemporaneous oral undertaking on the part of A to varrant
the quality of the machine beyond the warranties that the law would otherwise impos2
is inoperative. Oral representations by A of the quality of the machine which induce B
to enter into the written contract are, however, operative to create a warranty. The
representations are independent of the contract, though an inducement to its formation,
and the obligation of a warranty is imposed by law not from a promise but from an
assertion of fact." RESTA rEMET, CON"rLAcrs § 240 (1) (b) [7].
70. WLmS v, SALEs (2d ed. 1924) § 215; VoLD, SALES (1931) § 151.
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make an agreement in writing for the sale of a specific horse which A contem-
poraneously promises will be of a gentle and tractable nature, the oral war-
ranty is inoperative under the Restatement. But if A should orally represent
that the horse he sells is gentle and tractable, and such representation serves
as an inducement to the sale, such oral representation may be shown by parol.
The distinction suggested by the Restatement seeks sanctuary in the Uniform
Sales Act which in defining an express warranty speaks disjunctively of war-
ranties based on a "promise" or those based on an "affirmation" of fact. 71
In the English Sale of Goods Act, the precursor of the Uniform Sales Act, 1o
such distinction is made. 72  The diverse results attained in the Restatement
examples, where the warranty consists of an affirmation and not a promise, flow
from the assumption that although the writing may be presumed to represent
the whole agreement of the parties, such presumption does not militate against
proof by parol, even in the face of an integrated writing, of affirmations or
representations of fact. These affirmations or representations, it is argued,
are obligations independently imposed by law,78 and as such, they are not
excluded by the operation of the rule declared in Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating
Machine Co. which was limited in its operation to" the contractual obligations
of the parties. The difficulty with the Restatement thesis is that, seemingly,
both promissory warranties and warranties affirmative of facts are similar in
that the affirmative warranty may often contain the essentials of a promise
implied in fact.74  If the affirmation is a mere puffing statement or seller's
talk, the vendor, of course, incurs no liability.70  The actual intent motivating
the vendor's affirmation that "this horse will run the mile in 1:48" differs
little from the situation where the vendor expressly employs the word "promise"
or "warrant". In justice to the distinction drawn by the Restatement, it must
be admitted that the present day seller may not intend to be answerable
for his affirmation that "this horse will run the mile in 1:48" because he, with
a mistaken reverence for the tyranny of words, may not think he is bound
unless he says "I guarantee" or "I warrant": but the intent to warrant is not
an essential of the express warranty under the Sales Act; 70 the tendency to
induce the sale is the vital element. 77  Even though there is subjectively, no
71. "Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is
an express warranty . . ." UNOR.M SALEs AcT (1907) § 12.
72. "Warranty . . . means an agreement with reference to goods which are the sub-
ject of a contract of sale, but collateral to the main purpose of such contract . . ." SALE
or GooDs ACT (1893) § 62 (1). As to the varying meanings of the word "warranty" se
ANSON, CONTRACTS (14th ed. 1919) 461.
73. Notes 69, 70, supra.
74. But see Mechem, Implied and" Oral Warranties and the Parol Evidence Rule (1928)
12 MIx. L. REv. 210, 222, where it is said that such a suggestion (i.e., that every assertive
warranty contains an implied promissorial element) "leads into a blind alley" for in many
cases the implication could only be one of law.
75. Coats v. Hord, 29 Cal. App. 115, 154 Pac. 491 (1915); Boston Consol. Gas Co. v.
Folsom, 237 Mass. 565, 130 N. E. 197 (1921).
76. UNIFORM SALES Act (1907) § 12, and the Commissioners' Note thereunder; Schley
v. Zalis, 191 Atl. 563 (Md. 1937).
77. Id.
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intent on the seller's part to be answerable, the ascertainment of the seller's
intent is exceedingly difficult, in the absence of formulaic words. How is the
aforementioned warranty to be classified? Is it promissory or is it assertive of
fact?
The major objection to the distinction that the Restatement draws between
promissory warranties and warranties based on affirmations of fact is that
it is in conflict with the very rule78 it attempts to illustrate. The rule adopted
in the Restatement is substantially that laid down in Scitz v. Brewers' Refrig-
erating Machine Co., namely, that an oral agreement is not superseded by a
subsequent or contemporaneous integration in writing if the oral agreement
is such as might naturally be made as a separate agreement by parties situated
as were the parties to the contract. The test, as stated, is not based on any
theoretical distinction between contract and quasi-contract, or obligations im-
posed by the parties as distinguished from obligations imposed by law. The
assumption that affirmations of fact are not naturally integrated in writing
whereas promissory warranties are, is of somewhat doubtful validity. As has
been indicated, both warranties are usually identical in form. Both war-
ranties are usually similar in that they are jurally unfavorable to the seller,
and the jurally unfavorable facts of a contract, the inducements to the sale,
are those which the ordinary contracting parties would naturally be expected
to integrate in the written contract.7
Apparently the Uniform Sales Act did not intend to draw a sharp distinction,
or line of demarcation, between promises and affirmations of fact, between
nob and nabob, but merely intended to point out that statements other than
those promissory, in form or basic intent, might give rise to an express
warranty. 0
VI. TaE IMPLIED WAtRANTIS
An implied warranty is an obligation which is not expressly made by the
parties but which the law implies from the facts of a sale.8 ' The distinction
between the express and implied warranties is that the express warranty obliga-
tion arises from the agreement of the parties whereas in the implied warranties
78. See note 68, supra.
79. Strahorn, The Parol Evidetwe Rule and Warranties of Goods Sold (1935) 19 Mr;,.
L. REv. 725, 746.
80. Strahorn, The Parol Evidence Rule and Warraiies of Goods Sold (1935) 19 Mn-.
L. REv. 725, 740, n. 39. The New York rule, at common law, was directly opposcd to the
distinction set down by the Restatement. Under the Restatement rule an oral, prophetic
or promissory warranty that a chattel sold will perform in the future in a certain manner
may not be proved. See Strahorn, The Parol Evidence Ride and Warranties of Goods
Sold (1935) 19 M=x. L. REv. 725, 729. In New York it may be proved. Chapin v.
Dobson, 78 N. Y. 74, 34 Am. Rep. 512 (1879). Whereas under the Restatement the as-er-
tive warranty based on an affirmation of fact concerning the present condition of the
chattel may be proved by parol, Strahorn, ibid; in New. York, it may not. Eighmie v.
Taylor, 98 N. Y. 288 (1885).
Si. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Frank., 57 N. D. 295, 221 N. W. 75 (1928) (the
implied warranty of suitability for a particular purpose exists indep2ndently of the
contract).
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the obligation can only arise by operation of law.82 The latter are imposed
by law in the spirit of caveat venditor as a protection to the buyer, to promote
higher standards of business conduct, and to prevent sharp dealing by the
seller.8 3 The implied warranties under the Uniform Sales Act are the implied
warranties of title,8 4 quality,85 and warranties in sales of goods by description
or sample.8 6 It is evident if the parties to a sale have integrated their agree..
ment in writing, evidence of certain extrinsic facts must be shown in order
to prove the implied in law warranty. For example, the buyer in order to
prove a warranty of fitness for a particular use must show:
1) That he made known, expressly or by implication to the seller, the par-
ticular purpose for which the goods were purchased,
2) That he relied on the seller's skill and judgment.8 7
At first glance, the parol evidence rule would seem to preclude the intro-
duction of evidence of the implied warranties because they would certainly
add to, or vary, the terms of a written contract. But, as has been seen, the
scope of the rule as applied to warranties is restricted to contractual obligations,
either expressly made, or implied in fact from the language of the parties,
or if we might speak in terms of what is "naturally" included, it has been
deemed that the parties would not naturally integrate in the document of
sale the implied in law warranties.88 In fact it is not unusual for the con-
tracting parties to state specifically that the writing covers all the agreements
of sale, without intending to exclude the implied in law warranties.80  It
would seem, however, that the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose is an obligation which might readily or naturally be included in the
82. Ward v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mars. 90, 120 N. E. 225 (1918)
(warranty of merchantableness). "While this peculiar obligation is called a warranty
[merchantableness] for convenience, it does not rest upon any supposed intention of the
parties or agreement in fact but is one which the law raises upon principles foreign to
the contract in the interest of commercial honesty and fair dealing, and analogous to
those upon which vendors are held liable for fraud." Carleton v. Lombard, Ayers & Co.
149 N. Y. 137, 144 (1896). The obligation is quasi-contractual. WLLISTON, SALES
(1909) 304.
83. Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N. W. 790 (1927).
84. UNIFORM SALES AcT (1907) § 13.
85. UNmmoau SALES AcT (1907) § 15. In North Carolina there is no implied warranty
as to quality in the sale of personalty. Ashford v. Schrader, 167 N. C. 48, 83 S. E. 29
(1914), but there is an implied warranty of merchantability because the law assumes
that the seller does not desire tQ obtain money for a worthless article. Hall Furniture
Co. Inc. v. Crane Breed Mfg. Co., 169 N. C. 41, 85 S. E. 35 (1915).
86. UNITOP SALES AcT (1907) §§ 14, f6.
87. UNmRx'oR SALES Acr (1907) § 15 (1).
88. Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U. S. 114 (1883); Minneapolis Steel and
Machinery Co. v. Casey Land Agency, 51 N. D. 832, 201 N. W. 172 (1924). But See
Kullman, Salz & Co. v. Sugar Apparatus Mfg. Co., 153 Cal. 725, 729, 96 Pac. 369, 371
(1908) where the general rule of law is stated to be that "oral representations or war-
ranties, and implied warranties, and all oral negotiations are merged in the written con-
tract, and by its terms the parties must be bound."
89. Colt v. Bridges, 162 Ga. 154, 132 S. E. 889 (1926); Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn.
87, 216 N. W. 790 (1927).
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writing. Thus, where the buyer makes known to the seller the purpose for
which he purchases a horse, it would seem that the parties would ordinarily
and naturally integrate in writing that purpose, e.g., "a horse for hauling
stone".90  In fact, many of these warranties of suitability for a particular
purpose are contractual in their nature. The silent acquiescence of the seller
to the statement of the purchaser concerning the use to which the article of
sale is to be put, contains all the elements of an implied in fact warranty.
The exclusion of the operative facts which give rise to this implied in law
warranty has been recognized as subversive to the purpose of the implied in
law warranties, and the majority view is that a warranty of fitness may be
shown even in the face of a complete written contract.01
A similar problem arises in sales by sample. Apparently the majority
view is that, where the sale by sample is not mentioned in the writing, evidence
of implied warranties arising from such sales is inadmissible as adding to or
varying the instrument.9 2 Such decisions are harmonious with the test laid
down by Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigeration Machine Co. The natural acts of the
parties would be to integrate their agreement in relation to the sample in
their writing since it constituted one of the essential facts of their dealing. On
the basis that the parol evidence rule excludes only the contractual obligations
of the parties, the result is defensible since the sale by sample, although de-
scribed as an implied warranty at common law and by the Sales Act, is an
implied in fact contractual warranty.03 Usage alone required the retention of
the term implied warranty.94
This frequent failure of the courts to clearly define what is meant by the
term "implied warranty" 95 tends to leave doubtful the rights of the vendee
in the event of the breach of another so called implied warranty, that of title.
Generally, it has been indiscriminately described as an "implied warranty."20
If it is implied in law, its existence is provable even in the face of a complete
document of sale; if it is implied in fact, its existence cannot be proved since
it is a term naturally included in the integrated contract. The sparseness of
decisions on the point is due in large part to the fact that the vendor generally
warrants title in the instrument of sale, rarely by express declaration, more
90. Ottawa Bottle & Flint Glass Co. v. Gunther, 31 Fed. 203 (1887); Ventimiglia v.
Brockway Motor Truck Corp., 143 Misc. 6S1, 257 N. Y. Supp. 27 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
91. International Harvester Co. v. Bearn, 159 Ky. 842, 169 S. W. 549 (1914); Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Frank, 57 N. D. 295, 221 N. W. 75 (1928).
92. Standard Milling Co. v. De Pass, 154 App. Div. 525, 139 N. Y. Supp. 611 (1st
Dep't 1913), aff'd, 214 N. Y. 638, 10S N. E. 110S (1915). Cf. Stroock & Co. v. Lichten-
thal, 224 App. Div. 19, 229 N. Y. Supp. 371 (Ist Dep't). Although a samp!e may not be
used to establish a, warranty, it is admissible to establish the identity of the subject
matter of the sale. Germain Fruit Co. v. Armsby Co., 153 Cal. 585, 96 Pac. 319 (1903).
93. See Bradford v. Manly, 13 Mass. 133, 143, 7 Ain. Dec. 122, 124 (1816); Gurney
v. Atlantic Ry., 58 N. Y. 35S, 364 (1874); WLLmso., S.as (1909) 304.
94. 1 Wnmus.oN, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 223.
95. The result of this failure has been felt generally in warranty law. Waite, Retail
Responsibility and Judicial Law Making (1936) 34 Axcur. L. RM,. 494, 493.
96. Morley v. Attenborough, 3 Ex. 500, 154 Eng. Reprints 943 (1249); Eichholz v.
Bannister, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 703, 144 Eng. Reprints 284 (1864).
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often by necessary implication from the facts of the sale.97 Thus, although
the vendor to a conditional sales contract may not expressly warrant his title
to the subject matter, he impliedly does the same thing, by reserving title in
himself until full payment has been made by the vendee. 98 However, there are
some written contracts from the face of which a warranty of title cannot be
gleaned, and in jurisdictions where the title warranty is not considered an
obligation imposed by law, the warranty cannot be proved.00 Aside from
the question whether the warranty is implied in fact, or in law, the decisions
are unfortunate in that the warranty of title is not a term which the ordinary
contracting parties would integrate in their writing. Experience and the
Uniform Sales Act testify that the parties are rarely "title conscious". 100 For-
tunately, the majority tendency is to accept the warranty of title as imposed
by law,110 which is a judicial confirmation of the fact that the buyer of a
horse intends to purchase a horse and not a lawsuit.'0 2
VII. THE ExPIREss WARRANTY EXCLUDING THE IMPLIED WARRANTY
Since the written terms of sale may evince by implication the intent of the
parties to be bound by certain warranties, contrariwise the parties by implica-
tion may rebut the existence of a warranty obligation. It has sometimes been
stated as the common law rule that an express warranty appearing in the
written contract of sale excludes the possibility of the existence of an implied
in law warranty. 03 The rule as broadly stated is justified in those instances
where the warranty expressed in the sale is -contradictory of the implied
warranty sought to be effectuated. An examination of the cases laying down
such a rule indicates that generally its application is limited to such contra-
dictory warranties. 0 4 It is undeniable that when parties arrange for the sale
of, for example, a violin warranted to be a genuine Stradivarius, certain implied
warranties will arise by operation of law even though the warranty that the
instrument is a Stradivarius is expressed in the written contract. It would be
unreasonable to say that the express warranty excludes an implied warranty
of title,10 5 i.e., that the seller owned the violin and could give good title to it,
or that the implied warranty of suitability for a particular purpose, e.g., adapt-
ability for concert playing, was negatived by the express warranty.j0 0 If,
97. See Howland v. Doyle, 5 R. I. 33, 36 (1857); Morley v. Aftenborough, 3 Ex.
500, 512, 154 Eng. Reprints 943, 948 (1849) where it is stated that "usage" or the very
nature of the trade may evince the implied in fact intention of the parties.
98. MacDonald v. Mack Motor Truck Co., 127 Me. 133, 142 Atl. 68 (1928).
99. Sparks v. Messick, 65 N. C. 440 (1871); Howland v. Doyle, 5 R. I. 33 (1857).
100. Hence the necessity of an elaborate set of presumptions in § 19 of the UNIFoRM
SALEs Acr. 1 STREr, FOUNDATION Or LEGAL LIABiUT (1906) 383.
101. Word v. Cavin, 38 Tenn. 506 (1858); Topp v. White, 59 Tenn. 165 (1873).
102. Edwards v. Pearson, 6 T. L. R. 220 (1890).
103. American Varnish Co. v. Globe Furniture Co., 199 Mich. 316, 165 N. W. 1050
(1917). Contra: Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U. S. 108 (1883).
104. Bucy v. Pitts Agricultural Works, 89 Iowa 464, 56 N. W. 541 (1893). See John
A. Rochling's Sons Co. v. Southern Power Co., 142 Ga. 464, 467, 83 S. E. 138, 140 (1914).
105. Ibid.
106. Pryor v. Ludden & Bates Southern Music House, 134 Ga. 288, 67 S. E. 654
(1910).
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however, the contract described the instrument as a Stradivarius violin suitable
only for display, the implied warranty of suitability for playing cannot be
enforced. In such case the parties have seemingly contracted with the implied
warranty in mind, and have negatived any implication that it could operate
as a binding obligation on the vendor.1071 Similarly, the sale of the instrument
"as is" excludes the possibility of a warranty drising by implication of law.103
The rule has been adopted by the Uniform Sales Act which declares, "An
express warranty or condition does not negative a warranty or condition implied
under this act unless inconsistent therewith" 0 3
VIII. WmTE-N DiscLAn Rs OF '" TY
In certain phases of business sales written disclaiming clauses, expressly
authorized by the Uniform Sales Act, 110 render the question of proving, by
parol, warranties not expressly stated in the written contract of sale, one of
purely academic interest. The noteworthy characteristic of such disclaiming
clauses is their prevalence. Their use is not limited to the larger manu-
facturers, but their growth is fostered among the smaller industries by nation-
wide trade associations."' These disclaimers consist of two kinds: (I) an
express negation of any warranties other than those expressed in the printed
or written form,112 (2) a limitation on the purchaser's rights when the chattel
fails to perform according to the express warranty or warranties.113 This usually
consists of an exclusive remedy stipulation contained in the printed agreement
providing that the vendor has the right to substitute a new article or part,
for the defective article or part which constituted the subject of the sale. 1
Even a reasonable application by the courts of the maxim caveat emptor
would, of course, completely deprive the purchaser under such a standardized
contract of most of his legal remedies. Apparently, the written disclaimers
of any express warranties not contained in the written contract constitute so
much excess verbiage, since such express warranties would be excluded as
varying, or adding to, the complete written contract even in the absence of
107. See note 104, supra.
108. Franklin v. Nelson-Dowling Coal Co., 82 N. H. 96, 130 AtL 26 (1925). Cf. Morris
Run Coal Co. Inc. v. Carthage Sulphite Pulp Co., Inc., 210 App. Div. 578, 205 N. Y.
Supp. 676 (4th Dep't 1924); Prentice v. Fargo, 53 App. Div. 603, 65 N. Y. Supp. 114
(Ist Dep't 1900).
IO9. UNiroRsr SALns Acr (1907) § 15 (6).
110. UmruoaR SALEs AcT (1907) § 71.
111. For a listing of the more influential associations, see Bogert and Fink, Bi.zem
Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sak of Goods (1930) 25 Irs. L. REv. 400, 403.
112. Dayton Oakland Co. v. Livesay, 34 Ohio App. 302, 170 N. E. 8S0 (1929)
("There are no guarantees or representations, express or implied," that are not contained
in the written contract).
113. Clark Implement Co. v. Priebe, 52 S. D. 606, 219 N. W. 475 (1928) (replacement
of defective parts).
114. See Palaniuk v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 57 N. D. 190, 220 N. W. 633 (1923)
for a typical exclusive remedy provision in a contract of sale. The statement of sp2cial
remedy does not necessarily exclude the purchaser's other remedies. Remington Arms
Co. v. Gaynor Mfg. Co., 9S Conn. 721, 120 At. 572 (1923).
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the disclaiming clause." 5 But the rule of strict construction has been applied
by many courts to the interpretation of disclaiming clauses, not in opposition
to, but in spite of the doctrine of caveat emptor."10 The origin and use of
implied warranties as judicial and commercial counter-agents for caveat
emptorllT to promote high business standards, to prevent sharp dealings and
to promote fair play in business transactions is the motivation for such con-
struction.118 The presumption that the disclaimers in written contracts were
inserted for the benefit of the vendor has been described as conclusive.11 The
meaning of words has often been strained to the limits of logical elasticity
to protect the purchaser. Clauses disclaiming warranties "express or implied"
have been held insufficient to exclude the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, on the ground that only warranties implied in fact were
intended to be excluded. 20 This mode of interpretation bears marked simi-
larity to the interpretation of clauses limiting by contract the common law
liabilities of the carrier,121 or innkeeper,122 with the significant difference that
the carrier cannot relieve itself of all its common law liabilities, 123 whereas
the vendor of personalty by carefully couched wording can contract himself
out of the liabilities imposed by law.'24  Strict interpretation of disclaimers
may be justified on the ground that although the parties may have expressly
excluded any remedy on "implied in law warranties" it is doubtful, to take
the clearest example, that the seller and the buyer ever intended to negate the
warranty of title viz., that the seller owned the property and could transfer it
to the buyer. If the present rule, that the vendor can expressly exclude an
implied warranty, is carried to its logical conclusion, the implied warranty of
title may by seemingly innocent phraseology be excluded on the ground that
it contradicts the writing. Under the doctrine of caveat emptor to which all
courts make some obeisance (although in its inception the doctrine had little
115. Minneapolis Steel & Machinery Co. v. Casey Land Agency, 51 N. D. 832, 201
N. W. 172 (1924).
116. Minneapolis Steel & Machinery Co. v. Casey Land Agency, 51 N. D. 832, 201
N. W. 172 (1924). Where the seller's opportunity to inspect the commodity is lacking,
caveat emptor does not apply. Barnard v. Kellogg, 10 Wall. 387 (U. S. 1870).
117. It is said that the common law courts looked upon the implied in law warran-
ties as "subversive" and "insidious." Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor
(1931) 40 YALE L. J. 1133.
118. Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N. W. 790 (1927), wherein it was said:
"Defendant's claim does not commend itself to us as consistent with the honesty of
purpose with which they are entitled to be credited in their dealings with their cus-
tomers." International Harvester Co. v. Beam, 159 Ky. 842, 169 S. W. 549 (1914).
Mechem, Implied and Oral Warranties and the Parol Evidence Rule (1928) 12 MINN.
L. REV. 209, 218.
119. International Harvester Co. v. Beam, 159 Ky. 842, 169 S. W. 549 (1914).
120. International Harvester Co. v. Beam, 159 Ky. 842, 169 S. W. 549 (1914).
121. Kansas City, etc. Ry. v. Holland, 68 Miss. 351, 8 So. 516 (1891).
122. See Stanton v. Leland, 4 E. D. Smith 88, 91 (N. Y. 1855).
123. Louisville, etc. v. Wynn, 88 Tenn. 320, 14 S. W. 311 (1896).
124. Potash v. Reach, 272 Fed. 658 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1921); Minneapolis Threshing
Machine Co. v. Hocking, 54 N. D. 559, 209 N. W. 996 (1926). Liability, however, cannot
be evaded by a stipulation that the vendee cannot rely on fraudulent misrepresentation.
Pearson & Son Ltd. v. Lord Mayor of Dublin [1907] A. C. 351.
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commercial foundationim) it was presumed that the parties had freedom of
contract. Theoretically, they still have; the vendee has the option to purchase
or not to purchase. The fact is that a definite limitation exists on the pur-
chaser's contractual freedom. For example, under a contract of sale of any
type automobile, standard warranties are in universal use and the purchaser
must accept them or forego the purchase of an auto of any type. It has
been suggested that the aggrieved purchaser's most potent remedy lies under
the extra-legal "business good will" maxim that the "customer is always
right,"'126 but certainly the purchaser's rights should not be solely dependent,
as they so often are, upon such an illusory remedy as good business policy.
The solution offered is that "so far as rules of warranty, and more particularly,
rules of implied warranty, are intended to control contractors, they must be
rules of iron nature, and must therefore be not subject to effective contracting-
out."'' 2  A belated recognition of the evil by the legislature of one state has
cast certain warranties in the mold of "iron nature." Thus, a statute pro-
viding that a purchaser of farm machinery for his own use should be permitted
to rescind the contract of sale if the machinery should not be reasonably fit
for the purpose for which it was purchased and that any contractual provision
to the contrary should be considered against public policy and void, has been
upheld as a proper exercise of the police power -s
CONCLUSION
The operation of the parol evidence rule, insofar as warranties are affected,
has seemingly fulfilled its original purpose-that of giving stability to written
contracts. Cases of extreme hardship'12 9 where statements which undoubtedly
induced the buyer to purchase were excluded from proof by the operation of the
rule, may be pointed out as examples of the harshness of this doctrine which
pays so much reverence to the written word. Similarly, harsh cases have arisen
under the Statute of Frauds (the spirit vitalizing the parol evidence rule) but
the general benefit derived from that Statute is rarely disputed. The original
severity of the parol doctrine in the warranty field has been mitigated by the
recognition and enforcement of the implied in law warranties. The peril to
these implied in law obligations lurks in the contractual disclaimer; the remedy
whereby such disclaimers will be proscribed rests with the legislature. Such
reparative legislation may result in written contracts of sale which fairly repre-
sent the obligations incurred by the parties without being subjected to variance
by the inaccurate editing of uncertain memory.
125. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat .Enptor (1931) 40 YAMn L. J. 1133.
126. Bogert & Fink, Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods
(1930) 25 ILi L. RLa. 400, 415.
127. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Society (1937) 37 Co. L. RE%. 341, 386.
128. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co., Inc. v. Jackson, 287 U. S. 283 (1932). Analogout
statutory protection has been granted to the vendee under a conditional sales contract
whereby a waiver of a buyer's statutory protection is invalid. N. Y. Pras. Pnop. Lw
(1922) § So (f). The purpose of the section was to invalidate the use of waivers (usually
in small type) by "unscrupulous sellers". Commisioner's Note to § 26, U.-mor, Con-
DMITONAL Smx.rs Acr (1919).
129. Davis Calyx Drill Co. v. Mallory, 137 Fed. 332 (C. C. A. sth, 1905).
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